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Statistical and Mathematical Modeling versus NHST? 
There’s No Competition! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joseph Lee Rodgers 
University of Oklahoma 
 
 
Some of Robinson & Levin’s critique of Rodgers (2010) is cogent, helpful, and insightful – although 
limiting. Recent methodology has advanced through the development of structural equation modeling, 
multi-level modeling, missing data methods, hierarchical linear modeling, categorical data analysis, as 
well as the development of many dedicated and specific behavioral models. These methodological 
approaches are based on a revised epistemological system, and have emerged naturally, without the need 
for task forces, or even much self-conscious discussion. The original goal was neither to develop nor 
promote a modeling revolution. That has occurred; I documented its development and its status. Two 
organizing principles are presented that show how both perspectives can be reconciled and 
accommodated. A program of research that could not have occurred within the standard NHST 
epistemology, without a modeling perspective, is discussed. An historical and cross-disciplinary analogy 
suggests their view is similar to Galileo’s world view, whereas some branches of social and behavioral 
science may be ready for something closer to a Newtonian perspective. 
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Introduction 
Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) 
has, for many years, been the primary 
organizational and epistemological system by 
which we understand statistical practice in 
behavioral sciences. NHST has been frequently 
criticized, and in the late 1990s the criticism was 
sufficient to create substantial contention, 
explicit calls for NHST to be outlawed or 
abandoned, the appointment of an American 
Psychological Association task force to judge its 
status and to evaluate proper statistical practice, 
and a great deal of discussion and 
argumentation, both informally and in published 
articles. Before and during this same period, a 
different epistemological system, what I referred 
to in Rodgers (2010) as a modeling revolution 
was in development. With little discussion (and 
most of what would have naturally occurred has 
been largely drowned out by the clamor over 
NHST), mathematical and statistical modeling 
have become the set of organizing principles that 
has the potential to completely replace NHST as 
the primary epistemological system. And 
modeling should replace NHST, for several 
reasons. 
The first is because it is a more natural 
way for researchers to frame, think about, and 
conduct research, whereas NHST was a creation 
of and for statisticians. Second, modeling has 
more flexibility to support the maturation of 
both statistical and methodological practice 
within psychology and other behavioral 
sciences. Third, modeling includes NHST as a 
special case, and so NHST has not been replaced 
or even very much revised as a set of procedure. 
Robinson and Levin presented position 
statements that, in my career, I have taught to 
my students, and have applied in my research. 
These principles emerged from a strong and 
coherent philosophical background, including 
caution against over-interpretation of 
correlations, which emerged from John Stuart 
Mills’ (1843) inductive canons of scientific 
inquiry. Another principle is to use 
randomization if possible, which emerged from 
Fisher’s (1935) answer to the problem that Mill 
left open -- how can researchers equate groups, 
on average, before a manipulation? Yet another 
is to emphasize the importance of replication; 
this underappreciated practice serves the purpose 
of correcting the bad luck that can befall a 
researcher in “gaming with the devil” (see Box, 
1978, p. 144), and is another of Fisher‘s edicts 
that helped create the philosophical basis of 
social/behavioral science methodology. 
I could (almost) leave this reply 
hanging, and emphasize how correct and well-
founded are many of the positions stated in their 
critique. If so, though, I would necessarily 
conclude with some comments about how none 
of these principles has any import in evaluating 
either the status of NHST, or the development of 
statistical/mathematical modeling, or as criticism 
of my article, because these principles stand firm 
in relation to either NHST or statistical/ 
mathematical modeling. However, if I left my 
reply here, that would obfuscate my initial 
intent, which I believe has been 
mischaracterized. 
Two basic principles (and some 
potential quibbles with the language, to follow) 
are paramount, and within those principles their 
criticisms and my position statements will be 
simultaneously accommodated. The first 
principle is that NHST is the type of statistical 
paradigm that naturally applies to a rather 
immature science, whereas statistical modeling 
naturally fits a more mature, or at least maturing, 
science. The second principle is that NHST is 
subsumed within the modeling perspective. The 
two paradigms need not compete, as Robinson 
and Levin implied. Accept the modeling 
perspective, and it can be sharpened to the 
special case of the NHST perspective at any 
time; insist that NHST is the one, only, and 
proper epistemological position, and the full 
range and power of structural equation modeling 
(SEM), multi-level modeling (MLM), and 
dozens of specialty models are relegated to 
virtual impotence. 
 
Statistical Modeling Reflects and Supports the 
Maturation of Social/Behavioral Sciences 
The development of statistical and 
mathematical modeling as an epistemological 
system didn’t occur through high-level mandate 
or management; it has been a natural and 
emergent methodological feature of the maturing 
of psychology (and has parallels within 
education, economics, sociology, and other 
social/behavioral sciences). In this sense, it is a 
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mischaracterization to claim that I “condemn” 
NHST or that I “perceive vices of statistical 
hypothesis testing.” Most of my article was not 
prescriptive, despite their suggestions to the 
contrary; the part that is prescriptive has little to 
do with liking or condemning NHST. Rather, I 
described a developmental process that is well 
advanced, though relatively unexamined in 
historical perspective. As science has advanced, 
stronger statements are possible, ones that even 
in some cases move toward legitimate causal 
attribution. Nowhere in that previous sentence is 
there encouragement to assert unjustified 
causality. Further, to suggest that such 
unjustified claims occur – even to illustrate with 
specific examples – does no damage to the 
position that our science is maturing in that 
direction. Nor is science necessarily advanced 
by successful causal claims; sometimes, rather, 
it advances by identifying past mis-attributions, 
a process which Robinson and Levin support 
and appreciate. Ironically, though, certain 
versions of that process would not likely emerge 
from an NHST perspective. I described an 
example from my own research program. 
For many years, nearly an entire 
community of research psychologists has 
ignored a certain type of selection bias, resulting 
in the kind of mis-attributed causal process that 
Robinson & Levin (and I) decry. Scarr and 
McCartney (1983) made a stark statement 
concerning this design flaw, which is inherent in 
literally hundreds (perhaps thousands) of 
previous published papers: “passive genotype-
environment effects arise in biologically related 
families and render all of the research literature 
on parent-child socialization uninterpretable” (p. 
427). Using a quasi-experimental design that 
takes advantage of siblings to partially control 
for selection bias, along with a powerful sibling 
dataset, my colleagues and I have published a 
series of articles during the past decade that have 
separated and quantified the difference between 
certain types of inherent selection bias and the 
remaining correlational links, within which the 
causal attributions are logically expected to 
exist. 
I review several of these studies based 
on the sibling design and on the children-of-
siblings design. (Besides these, other quasi-
experimental design innovations exist that also 
can also be used to separate family-based 
selection bias from parental and family 
influence; see D’Onofrio, 2003, for description 
of the children-of-twins design and Rodgers, et 
al, 2008, for description of the mother-daughter-
aunt-niece design). Rodgers, et al. (2000) 
showed how selection bias has improperly 
influenced the interpretation of birth order-
intelligence links; at least most (perhaps all) of 
what has appeared to be birth order effects on 
intelligence in past research has actually been 
between-family differences in parental education 
and IQ, among others (see Rodgers, 2001 for 
further explanation of this logic, Wichman, et 
al., 2006, for a modeling demonstration of this 
phenomenon, and Wichman, et al., 2007, for 
further elaboration). D’Onofrio, et al. (2008) 
showed how the link between smoking during 
pregnancy and child conduct problems is at least 
partially caused by the kind of women who 
smoke during pregnancy, thus challenging much 
of the direct causal attribution. 
D’Onofrio, et al. (2009) used a similar 
design to investigate the relationship between 
family income and child conduct problems, with 
similar conclusions. Mendle, et al. (2009) 
applied this type of sibling control to study the 
link between father absence and age at first 
intercourse, and found that much of the apparent 
direct link between father absence and age at 
first intercourse has likely been caused by shared 
genetic factors in the background. Harden, et al. 
(2009) studied whether population density has a 
direct  influence on antisocial behavior during 
adolescence, or whether the apparent link is due 
to selection bias; the latter was more strongly 
supported. Finally, Jaffee, et al. (2011) showed 
how placement of infants and young children in 
day care as an influence on both achievement 
and behavioral problem scores in childhood is 
almost completely attributable to the type of 
women who put their children in day care, 
leaving very little remaining variance to attribute 
to the direct influence of the day care experience 
in and of itself on these child outcomes. 
For the purposes of this reply, these 
findings make a strong statement about both 
modeling and NHST. Each result above 
depended on strong design logic combined with 
a statistical modeling exercise. Further, each 
study contained within it a number of NHST 
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results, but the organizational principles 
emerged from a research perspective that 
required longitudinal and within-family data, 
strong research designs, powerful measurement 
tools, and sophisticated statistical models. They 
would not have likely emerged from an NHST 
epistemology. Nor are the conclusions that 
emerge from this type of work necessarily 
causal; indeed, most of the conclusions above 
challenge previous causal attributions. 
In the tradition of Cook and Campbell 
(1979) and Shadish, et al. (2002), the 
researchers’ goal, whether in quasi-experimental 
or experiment research, is to address as many 
threats as possible to internal validity, the 
validity of causal attribution, and to admit freely 
and to self-evaluate in the face of those that 
remain. Robinson and Levin admitted to this 
maturational challenge: “Our field of 
educational psychology is filled with such 
examples of comparing new innovations with 
ridiculous strawperson control conditions that no 
sane researcher would ever consider using.” So 
are psychology, sociology, etc., of course. And 
so the proper and defensible approach is exactly 
where they stated it should be, using an 
appropriate set of methodological tools to draw 
cautious but legitimate conclusions, and to avoid 
wasting time asking superficial and uninteresting 
questions. Hopefully, those methodological tools 
expand to accommodate improvements, 
maturation, in the science that they support. 
Statistical modeling is an example of such 
expansion. 
 
Statistical Modeling Subsumes NHST 
There exists a way to view both NHST 
and statistical modeling that accommodates both 
Rodgers (2010) and Robinson and Levin's 
critique. That accommodation was stated in my 
original article, but here I shall present this 
argument in different words. Robinson and 
Levin presumed I was prescriptively criticizing 
NHST; that I favor modeling and oppose NHST: 
“Rodgers (2010) has written a cogent essay on 
what he perceives as the vices of statistical 
hypothesis testing and the virtues of statistical 
modeling.” First, my article was intended to be 
more of an historical account than a desideratum 
about what should be. Second, I was a strong 
opponent of outlawing, abandoning, or 
otherwise providing any type of institutional 
control over NHST (or any other methodology). 
I have used the NHST paradigm often, in most 
of my published research. I have also used 
modeling approaches, when they appeared to be 
useful and appropriate. 
Many of my publications incorporated 
both, which leads to my third comment: I do 
become prescriptive when I describe in detail 
how the statistical modeling strategy subsumes 
NHST, because I’m convinced of the value of 
both approaches. Hence, the crux of my reply: 
NHST is a proper paradigm, but it is a special 
case of a broader and thus more flexible 
paradigm. I do not agree there are two 
competing approaches. One is broader and one 
is a special case. The modeling approach uses 
NHST as a fundamental part of the modeling 
framework. As Rodgers (2010) explained: 
 
As the two models ... are evaluated, no 
chance-level null hypothesis is posited, 
nor is an alternative constructed, at least 
not in the sense that those concepts are 
usually treated. However, traditional 
statistical concepts are used in this 
comparison, such as a test statistic (e.g., 
Chi-square values), a sampling 
distribution (the theoretical chi-square), 
and an alpha level (to tune the trade-off 
between fit and parsimony). Further, the 
NHST perspective is embedded within 
this statistical evaluation in the sense 
that there is a null hypothesis built into 
the model comparison (i.e., whether the 
population parameters ... are equal to 
one another). (p. 7) 
 
NHST is a tool, as a way to answer a certain 
question. I’ve never understood why researchers 
would be satisfied with the conclusion to reject 
Ho or fail to reject Ho, unless the research 
question was simple enough to warrant such a 
conclusion. It seems to me that when the 
research questions become more complex, 
modeling has the potential to provide more 
complex answers, and to move scientific 
epistemology forward substantially further than 
what can be obtained via NHST. 
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Minor Issues 
There are some mischaracterizations in 
their critique that require a response (though the 
majority are accounted for by the two principles 
in the previous sections). They suggested that 
“he then goes on to discuss NHST as a hybrid 
and condemns it;” I did not, though I cited  
Gigerenzer (1993), who did. They implied that I 
supported a ban on NHST, when I actually 
opposed such a ban. They claimed that “Rodgers 
also condemns the NHST ‘jurisprudence 
model,” whereas in fact I teach and promote this 
way of thinking of NHST. They suggested that 
“Rodgers mischaracterizes Tukey’s ‘exploratory 
data analysis’ strategy insofar as the detective 
nature of that hypothesis-generating approach 
clearly is not jurisprudence,” but I did not link 
the detective and jurisprudence components – 
after describing the role of jurisprudence within 
research, I stated “The researcher is also a 
detective” (p. 3, italics added for emphasis). 
They failed to make the connection that my 
section titled “Criticism and Adjustment of 
NHST” was historical; their first sentence in 
their section “The Null Hypothesis Hullabaloo” 
recognized historical goals, but the remainder of 
that section was not about the “hullabaloo,” but 
rather about their perception that I promulgated 
it, although I did not.  Finally, they suggested 
that “he gives short shrift to approaches that 
have defended reasonable and proper 
applications of statistical hypothesis testing,” 
and cited four articles that would have provided 
more balance. In fact, I discussed three of those 
articles. 
NHST is a worthy, valuable, and useful 
tool. It helps researchers to answer a certain 
question, framed in a certain way. However, its 
weaknesses are well-known, and often discussed 
(see Wainer, 1999, for a balanced and interesting 
account, among dozens of others). Further, as 
the field of behavioral science matures, it should 
not stand as the epistemological basis of 
research methodology within the field of 
psychological science, because modeling is 
more useful, flexible, and better supports the 
future of behavioral science research. 
This methodological practice should not 
be banned or outlawed for two reasons. First, 
such practice should not be managed at the 
institutional level (any more than the workers’ 
union should decide to ban hammers or electric 
saws). Second, NHST has served its value in 
thousands of scientific settings. It has also been 
misused, and Robinson and Levin provided 
support for its proper and legitimate use, in this 
and other published articles. 
Regarding “the ‘revolution’ about which 
Rodgers writes is neither quiet nor 
methodological,” they were correct, as I 
originally asserted. The NHST hullabaloo was 
anything but quiet. But the modeling revolution 
was so quiet that apparently many didn’t notice, 
and now aren’t sure that it occurred. Robinson 
and Levin contend that the revolution was not 
methodological, that the issues are entirely 
statistical. SEM contains both a structural and a 
measurement model. Multi-level modeling 
accounts for clustering, which is often caused by 
sampling processes. Multilevel modeling also 
cannot be separated from the design issues that 
generated the different levels. Analytic 
procedures that handle missing data require 
specification of the generating processes – 
sampling, measurement, etc. – that produced the 
missing values. In other words, modern 
statistical models account for design, sampling, 
and measurement, as well as the formal 
statistical properties of statistical models. As one 
example, MacCallum and Tucker (1991) could 
not have developed their conceptualization 
separating sampling and model error if they had 
used an NHST epistemology. 
It is perhaps not surprising that those 
whose way of thinking about the advancement 
of behavioral science is embedded in the NHST 
tradition would not recognize the modeling 
revolution as bringing about the expansion of 
statistical practice to include many other features 
of the methodological arena. But such 
broadening is one among many features of 
statistical/mathematical modeling that make the 
use of SEM, MLM, missing data approaches, 
and other modeling methods exciting and useful. 
To expand their analogy, there are new dangers 
created in using models, and their misuse cannot 
be supported (Cliff, 1983). The danger is 
analogous to learning how to use electric saws, 
when hand saws used to be the state-of-the-art. 
We can either decry electric saws, or teach their 
proper and safe use. One of premier psychology 
quantitative journals is called Psychological 
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Methods, and publishes articles on design, 
sampling, measurement, and statistics, as well as 
how these different areas overlap and inform one 
another. 
 
Conclusion 
Consider an analogy from the history of science 
to illustrate the points made in my response. The 
analogy draws on two popular science books, 
Sobel (2000) and Gleick (2003). The late 16th 
and early 17th century occupied a remarkable 
period of scientific ascendancy in the field of 
astronomy. In 1543, Copernicus offered the 
insightful (yet heretical) view that the earth 
revolved around the sun, rather than vice versa. 
Galileo was born shortly after, and as Sobel 
noted, “All his [Galilio’s] observations lent 
credence to the unpopular sun-centered universe 
of Nicolas Copernicus, which had been 
introduced over half a century previously, but 
foundered on lack of evidence” (p. 7). The 
observations to which Sobel referred were of 
course obtained with Galilio‘s new invention, 
the telescope, through which he observed the 
moons of Jupiter, the face of earth’s moon, and 
the sunspots moving across the face of the sun. 
Such observations were, in modern language, 
exploratory evidence in support of a previously 
proposed theory. 
Although probabilistic reasoning was 
still in its infancy (and was being developed by 
Fermat and Pascal in France during the same 
historical epoch), the epistemological basis of 
scientific inquiry in astronomy during that 
period was similar to that in psychology during 
the 20th century. The NHST paradigm that 
Robinson & Levin vigorously defended was 
similar to the one used by Galileo and others 
during the period of time in which they were 
collecting information (using telescopes and 
otherwise). Ultimately, such information of 
course inductively coheres into theoretical 
propositions. Galileo offered multiple sources of 
astronomical evidence for a heliocentric view of 
the solar system, including the movement of 
sunspots, the eclipses of the moons of Jupiter, 
and the tides on earth. Each might be viewed as 
a separate astronomical significance test of the 
null hypothesis that the earth was at the center of 
the universe, a hypothesis that we have 
ultimately rejected. But astronomy quickly 
moved on beyond the question of whether the 
Copernican system could be rejected or not. 
Kepler, in 1609 and 1619, published his 
three laws of planetary motion, and Newton 
(who was born in 1642, the year that Galilio 
died), published in 1687 his Principia, stating 
formal mathematical models of motion and the 
universal law of gravity. These “laws” stepped 
up to a new epistemological level, using 
previous observations as the basis for 
mathematical models that were designed to 
subsume many previous disparate and separate 
astronomical observations. (The development of 
the double-helix model of DNA is another 
example in a different discipline in which 
disparate observations were brought together 
inductively using mathematical modeling.) 
To bring these historical references to 
the current discussion, Robinson and Levin 
wrote: “we agree that - in the field of education - 
we have enough theory development studies and 
need more studies that address practical ‘what 
works‘ questions.” Fair enough. They argued 
that in many domains of our immature science 
more knowledge is needed, that more 
educational and psychological telescopes need to 
be brought to bear on current problems. Nothing 
in my own teaching, thinking, or research 
practice holds anything but praise and agreement 
for such a position. Indeed, two of my primary 
courses over the past 30+ years of teaching have 
been Exploratory Data Analysis and 
Quantitative Methods in Evaluation Research, 
where students learn to engage exactly this kind 
of goal, to address practical "what works" 
questions. 
Then, they stated, “It is our fear that a 
research approach where the question ‘Does the 
data fit my model?’ is far more dangerous than 
the question ‘Is there anything here worth 
pursuing?’” Again, fair enough. Without 
knowledge, both scientists and those who 
consume the science (policymakers, the public, 
etc.) can be led to the modern equivalent of the 
geocentric universe, and there is indeed danger 
in promulgating positions both pro and con in 
the absence of adequate knowledge, or even 
with substantial knowledge when that 
knowledge is at odds with societal expectations 
(just ask Galilio!). But does such lurking danger 
excuse statisticians and methodologists from 
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developing proper tools, perspectives, and whole 
epistemological systems to support the 
development and evaluation of such models? 
My answer, strongly implied throughout 
the original article, is indeed not. Both the 
NHST epistemology they promoted for 
relatively immature science, and the one that 
they view as dangerous, the modeling approach, 
should exist side-by-side within the arena of 
quantitative methods in both education and 
psychology. I promoted the development of the 
latter, not erasing the former. The former can 
only be criticized when it purports to serve the 
function of the latter. What is dangerous is 
asking NHST to provide methodological support 
beyond that for which it was designed. NHST 
can answer the question, “Is the null hypothesis 
plausible, or not?” It was not designed to answer 
the question, “Which of these two competing 
mathematical models is preferable in the way 
that it handles the trade-off between fit and 
parsimony?” In areas of behavioral science that 
are ready for more strongly confirmatory 
research – including the development of 
mathematical and statistical models that contain 
both causal and explanatory components (which 
are, of course, not entirely the same thing) – 
NHST is naturally expanded into the broader 
modeling epistemology. That expansion was the 
subject of my article. The earlier view of NHST 
as providing epistemological support for 
important but often separate and disparate 
individual findings is the topic of Robinson and 
Levin’s criticism. Both stand effectively before 
criticism. 
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